Recently there have been some unexpected results concerning Fuzzy Description Logics (FDLs) with General Concept Inclusions (GCIs). They show that, unlike the classical case, the DL ALC with GCIs does not have the finite model property under Lukasiewicz Logic or Product Logic and, specifically, knowledge base satisfiability is an undecidable problem for Product Logic. We complete here the analysis by showing that knowledge base satisfiability is also an undecidable problem for Lukasiewicz Logic.
Introduction
Description Logics (DLs) [1] play a key role in the design of Ontologies. Indeed, DLs are important as they are essentially the theoretical counterpart of the Web Ontology Language OWL 2 [19] , the standard language to represent ontologies.
It is very natural to extend DLs to the fuzzy case and several fuzzy extensions of DLs can be found in the literature. For a recent survey on the advances in the field of fuzzy DLs, we refer the reader to [18] . Besides the enrichment of DLs with fuzzy features, one of the challenges of the research in this community is the fact that different families of fuzzy operators (or fuzzy logics) lead to fuzzy DLs with different computational properties.
Decidability of fuzzy DLs is often shown by adapting crisp DL tableau-based algorithms to the fuzzy DL case [8, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26] , or a reduction to classical DLs [5, 6, 7, 9, 24] , or relying on some Mathematical Fuzzy Logic [13] based procedures [11, 12, 14, 15] .
However, recently there have been some unexpected surprises [2, 3, 4] . Indeed, unlike the classical case, for the DL ALC with GCIs (i) [4] shows that it does not have the finite model property under Lukasiewicz Logic or Product Logic, illustrates that some algorithms are neither complete not correct, and shows some interesting conditions under which decidability is still guaranteed; and (ii) [2, 3] show that knowledge base satisfiability is an undecidable problem for it under Product Logic. Also worth mentioning is [10] , which illustrates the undecidability of knowledge base satisfiability if one replaces the truth set [0, 1] with complete De Morgan lattices equipped with a t-norm operator.
In this paper, we complete the analysis by showing that knowledge base satisfiability is an undecidable problem for the DL ALC with GCIs under [0, 1]-valued Lukasiewicz Logic as well. We prove our result following conceptually the methods devised in [2, 3, 10] .
We next introduce briefly our fuzzy DL, then we illustrate the undecidability result.
The FDL L-ALC
In this section we are going to introduce the general definitions of L-ALC based on Lukasiewicz t-norm.
Syntax. Let A be a set of concept names, R be a set of role names. Concept names denote unary predicates, while role names denote binary predicates. The set of L-ALC concepts are built from concept names A (also called atomic concepts) using connectives and quantification constructs over roles R 1 as described by the following syntactic rules:
An assertion axiom is an expression of the form a:C, n (concept assertion, a is an instance of concept C to degree at least n) or of the form (a 1 , 1 2 ):R, n (role assertion, (a 1 , a 2 ) is an instance of role R to degree at least n), where a, a 1 , a 2 are individual names, C is a concept, R is a role name and n ∈ (0, 1] is a rational (a truth value). An ABox A consists of a finite set of assertion axioms. A General Concept Inclusion (GCI) axiom is of the form C 1 ⊑ C 2 , n (C 1 is a subconcept of C 2 to degree at least n), where C i is a concept and n ∈ (0, 1] is a rational. A concept hierarchy T , also called TBox, is a finite set of GCIs. In what follows we will use the following shorthands:
• C 1 ⊑ C 2 for C 1 ⊑ C 2 , 1 and a:C for a:C, 1 ;
• C 1 ≡ C 2 for the two axioms C 1 ⊑ C 2 and C 2 ⊑ C 1 ;
, and min{C 1 , . . . , C n } for min{. . . min{C 1 , C 2 }, . . .};
• max{C 1 , C 2 } for (C 1 → C 2 ) → C 2 and max{C 1 , . . . , C n } for max{. . . max{C 1 , C 2 }, . . .};
1 Each symbol may have super-and/or subscripts. Table 1 : Semantics for L-ALC.
• n · C for the n-ary disjunction C ⊔ . . . ⊔ C;
Finally, a knowledge base K = T , A consists of a TBox T and an ABox A.
Semantics. From a semantics point of view, an axiom α, n constrains the truth degree of the expression α to be at least n. In the following, we use ⊗, ⊕, ⊖ and ⇒ to denote Lukasiewicz t-norm, t-conorm, negation function, and implication function, respectively [17] . They are defined as operations in [0, 1] by means of the following functions:
where a and b are arbitrary elements in [0, 1]. As in the classical framework, the implication can be defined in terms of disjunction (whose semantics is the t-conorm) and negation in the usual way: a ⇒ b = ⊖a ⊕ b. Note also that for any implication defined from a continuous t-norm ⊗, it holds that: x ⇒ y = max{z | x ⊗ z ≤ y}, which is equivalent to the condition:
A fuzzy interpretation (or model) is a pair I = (∆ I , · I ) consisting of a nonempty (crisp) set ∆ I (the domain) and of a fuzzy interpretation function · I that assigns:
The fuzzy interpretation function is extended to complex concepts as specified in Table 1 (where x, y ∈ ∆ I are elements of the domain). Hence, for every complex concept C we get a function C I : ∆ I → [0, 1]. The satisfiability of axioms is then defined by the following conditions:
It is interesting to point out that the satisfaction of a GCI of the form C ⊑ D, 1 is exactly the requirement that ∀x ∈ ∆ I , C I (x) ≤ D I (x) (i.e., Zadeh's set inclusion); hence, in this particular case for the satisfaction it only matters the partial order and not the exact value of the implication ⇒.
As it is expected we will say that a fuzzy interpretation I satisfies a KB K in case that it satisfies all axioms in K. And it is said that a fuzzy KB K is satisfiable iff there exist a fuzzy interpretation I satisfying every axiom in K.
In this paper, we mainly focus on witnessed models. This notion (see [14] ) corresponds to the restriction to the DL language of the notion of witnessed model introduced, in the context of the first-order language, by Hájek in [16] . Specifically, a fuzzy interpretation I is said to be witnessed iff it holds that for every complex concepts C, D, every role R, and every x ∈ ∆ I there is some
If I satisfies only condition 1. then I is said to be weakly witnessed. Note that for Lukasiewicz logic, condition 1. and 2. are equivalent, so I is weakly witnessed iff I is witnessed. Thorough the paper we will rely on the notion of witnessed interpretation only, but keep in mind that the results apply, thus, to weakly witnessed interpretations as well. Note also that it is obvious that all finite fuzzy interpretations (this means that ∆ I is a finite set) are indeed strongly witnessed but the opposite is not true.
Sometimes (see, e.g., [3] ), the notion of witnessed interpretatations is strengthened to so-called strongly witnessed interpretations by imposing that additionally that for every complex concepts C, D and every x ∈ ∆ I there is some
has to hold. We do not deal with strongly witnessed interpretations here.
A fuzzy KB K is said to be satisfiable iff there exist a fuzzy interpretation I satisfying every axiom in K.
Undecidability of L-ALC with GCIs
Our proof consists in a reduction of the reverse of the Post Correspondence Problem (PCP) and follows conceptually the one in [2, 3, 10] . PCP is well-known to be undecidable [20] , so is the reverse PCP, as shown next. Let v 1 , . . . , v p and w 1 , . . . , w p be two finite lists of words over an alphabet Σ = {1, . . . , s}. The Post Correspondence Problem (PCP) asks whether there is a non-empty sequence i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k , with
Definition 1 (PCP).
Such a sequence, if it exists, is called a solution of the problem instance.
For the sake of our purpose, we will rely on a variant of the PCP, which we call Reverse PCP (RPCP). Essentially, words are concatenated from right to left rather than from left to right.
Definition 2 (RPCP)
For a word µ = i 1 i 2 . . . i k ∈ {1, . . . , p} * we will use v µ , w µ to denote the words
We denote the empty string as ǫ and define v ǫ is ǫ. The alphabet Σ consists of the first s positive integers. We can thus view every word in Σ * as a natural number represented in base s + 1 in which 0 never occurs. Using this intuition, we will use the number 0 to encode the empty word. Now we show that the reduction from PCP to RPCP is a very simple matter and it can be done through the transformation of the instance lists to the lists of their palindromes defined as follows: let Σ = {1, . . . , s} be an alphabet and v = t 1 t 2 . . . t |v| a word over Σ, with t i ∈ Σ, for 1 ≤ j ≤ |v|, then the palindrome of v is defined as pal(v) = t |v| t |v|−1 . . . t 1 .
Lemma 3. Let v 1 , . . . , v p and w 1 , . . . , w p be two finite lists of words over an alphabet Σ = {1, . . . , s}. For every non-empty sequence i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k , with 1 ≤ i j ≤ p it holds that
(P roof ) First we prove by induction on k, that, for every sequence
• The case k = 1 is straightforward.
Since the palindrome of a word is unique, we have that, if
Corollary 4. The RPCP is undecidable.
(P roof ) The proof is based on the reduction of PCPs to RCPs. For every instance ϕ = (v 1 , w 1 ), . . . , (v p , w p ) of PCP, let f be the function
Clearly f is a computable function. Moreover, ϕ ∈ P CP if and only if there exists a non-empty sequence i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k , with 1
i.e., f (ϕ) ∈ RP CP . Therefore, ϕ ∈ P CP if and only if f (ϕ) ∈ RP CP .
Undecidability of general KB satisfiability. We show the undecidability by a reduction of RPCPs to KB satisfiability problems. Specifically, given an instance ϕ of RPCP, we will construct a Knowledge Base O ϕ that is satisfiable iff ϕ has no solution.
In order to do this we will encode words v from the alphabet Σ as rational numbers 0.v in [0, 1] in base s + 1; the empty word will be encoded by the number 0.
So, let us define the TBox
and for 1 ≤ i ≤ p the TBoxes
Now, let
Further we define the ABox A as follows:
A := {a : ¬V, a : ¬W, a : A, 0.01 , a : ¬A, 0.99 } .
Finally, we define
We now define the interpretation
as follows:
. . i k−1 (last index i k is dropped from µ, and we assume that 0.ǫ is 0),
It is easy to see that I ϕ is a witnessed model of O ϕ (note that e.g.,
Moreover, as in [2] it is possible to prove that, for every witnessed model I of O ϕ , there is a mapping g from I ϕ to I.
Lemma 5. Let I be a witnessed model of O ϕ . Then there exists a function g : ∆ Iϕ → ∆ I such that, for every µ ∈ ∆ Iϕ , C Iϕ (µ) = C I (g(µ)) holds for every concept name C and R
, g(µi)) holds for every i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ p.
(P roof ) Let I be a witnessed model of O ϕ . We will build the function g inductively on the length of µ.
(ǫ) Since I is a model of O ϕ , then there is an element δ ∈ ∆ I such that a I = δ. Since I is a model of A ϕ , setting g(ǫ) = δ, we have that V Iϕ (ǫ) = 0 = V I (g(ǫ)) and the same holds for concept W . Moreover, since I is a model of T ϕ , we have that
) and the same holds for V 2 , W 1 and W 2 . On the other hand, we have that A Iϕ (ǫ) = 0.01 = A I (g(ǫ)), as well. So, g(ǫ) = δ satisfies the condition of the lemma.
(µi) Let now µ be such that g(µ) has already been defined. Now, since I is a witnessed model and satisfies axiom ⊤ ⊑ ∃R i .⊤, then for all i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ p, there exists a γ ∈ ∆ I such that
). Furthermore, by inductive hypothesis, we can assume that V I (g(µ)) = 0.v µ and W I (g(µ)) = 0.w µ . Since I satisfies axiom V ⊑ (s + 1)
Since I satisfies axiom (s + 1)
Since I satisfies axioms A ⊑ (s + 1) max{|v i |,|w i |} · ∀R i .A, we have that
Likewise, since I satisfies axioms (s + 1) max{|v i |,|w i |} · ∃R i .A ⊑ A, we have that
and, thus,
Therefore,
which completes the proof.
From the last Lemma it follows that if the RPCP instance ϕ has a solution µ, for some µ ∈ {1, . . . , p} + , then v µ = w µ and, thus, 0.v µ = 0.w µ . Therefore, every witnessed model I of O ϕ contains an element δ = g(µ) such that V I (δ) = V I φ (µ) = 0.v µ = 0.w µ = W I φ (µ) = W I (δ). Conversely, from the definition of I ϕ , if ϕ has no solution, then there is no µ such that 0.v µ = 0.w µ , i.e., there is no µ such that V I φ (µ) = W I φ (µ).
However, as O ϕ is always satisfiable, it does not yet help us to decide the RPCP. We next extend O ϕ to O ′ ϕ in such a way that an instance ϕ of the RPCP has a solution iff the ontology O ′ ϕ is not witnessed satisfiable and, thus, establish that the KB satisfiability problem is undecidable. To this end, consider
The intuition here is the following. If there is a solution for RPCP then, by the observation before, there is a point δ in which the value of V and W coincide under I. That is, the value of ¬(V ↔ W ) is 0 and, thus, the one of ¬(V ↔ W ) ⊔ ¬A) is less than 1. So, I cannot satisfy the new GCI in T ′ ϕ and, thus, O ′ ϕ is not satisfiable. On the other hand, if there is no solution to the RPCP then in I ϕ there is no point in which V and W coincide and, thus, ¬(V ↔ W ) > 0. However, we will show that the value of ¬(V ↔ W ) in all points is strictly greater than A and, as A ⊔ ¬A is 1, so also ¬(V ↔ W ) ⊔ ¬A will be 1 in any point. Hence, I φ is a model of the aditional axiom in T ′ ϕ , i.e., O ′ ϕ is satisfiable.
Theorem 6. The instance ϕ of the RPCP has a solution iff the ontology O ′ ϕ is not witnessed satisfiable. For the converse, assume that ϕ has no solution. On the one hand we know that I ϕ is a model of O ϕ . On the other hand, since ϕ has no solution, then there is no µ = i 1 . . . i k such that v µ = w µ (i.e., 0.v µ = 0.w µ ) and, therefore, there is no µ ∈ ∆ Iϕ such that V Iϕ (µ) = W Iϕ (µ). Consider µ ∈ ∆ Iϕ and i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ p and assume, without loss of generality, that V Iϕ (µi) < W Iϕ (µi). Then 
